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Abstract Several studies (Onishi and Baillargeon 2005; Surian et al. 2007) demon-
strated that children younger than 3 years of age, who consistently fail the standard
verbal false-belief task, can anticipate others’ actions based on their attributed false
beliefs. This gave rise to the so-called “Developmental Paradox”. De Bruin and Kästner
(2012) recently suggested that the Developmental Paradox is best addressed in terms of
the relation between coupled (online) and decoupled (offline) processes and argued that
if enactivism is to be a genuine alternative to classic cognitivism, it should be able to
bridge the “cognitive gap”, i.e. to provide us with a convincing account of how low-
level sensorimotor practices transform into higher-order representational skills. This
paper defends, against De Bruin and Kästner, an enactive response to the
Developmental Paradox. I argue that 3-year olds’ failure to verbally report their false-
belief understanding does not arise from stronger decoupling demands. Rather, they fail
because the elicited response false-belief trials involve representational decoupling tout
court and what is more, under pressure.
1 Introduction: The Cognitive Gap
There is a new gap in town, namely the cognitive gap. Unlike the mind-body problem
and its famous inheritor, the explanatory gap, the cognitive gap challenge is supposed
to build a bridge the between low-level sensorimotor embodied practices and higher-
order representational skills. Indeed, it has been argued that when it comes to “high-
level” cognition, the representationalist paradigm is still without serious rival.
Representationalism is roughly the view that “the manipulation and use of representa-
tions is the primary job of the mind” (Dretske 1995: xiv). Recently, representationalism
has been challenged on the grounds that we have evolved from creatures whose neural
resources were devoted primarily to perceptual and motoric processing, and whose
cognitive activity consisted largely of immediate interaction with the environment
(Bermúdez 2003; Chemero 2009; Gallagher 2005; Hutto 2008; Hutto and Myin
2013; Menary 2007). These theorists assume that cognitive processes are underpinned
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by the same processes that are used in physical interactions. Cognition is embodied in
the sense that it depends on the experiences that result from possessing a body with
given physical characteristics and a particular sensorimotor system. Indeed, a growing
number of researchers in cognitive science are proposing that rather than viewing the
body as a support system for a “mind that need to be fueled and transported” (Pecher
and Zwaan 2005), one needs to view the mind as a support system that facilitates the
functioning of the body. The embodied/enactive cognition (EC) approaches split in turn
into two branches, (i) reconciliatory and (ii) radical, depending on their commitment to
the idea that basic cognition involves or not the manipulation of representations. On the
reconciliatory side, some theorists call on representations to explain behaviour, al-
though they call on them in such a way that the need for internal manipulation of
symbols is reduced. The representations they call on are either indexical-functional
(Agre and Chapman 1987), “pushmi-pullyu” (Millikan 1995), action-oriented (Clark
1997), or emulator representations (Grush 1997; Churchland 2002). Opposing this
view, radical embodied cognition (REC) challenges representationalism’s conceptual
foundations, namely the idea that mentality is essentially content involving and an
exclusively heady affair. This relatively new research paradigm in cognitive science
aims to study perception, cognition, and action as necessarily “embodied phenomena,
using explanatory tools that do not posit mental representations. It is cognitive science
without mental gymnastics” (Chemero 2009:29, emphasis added). Of course, this is not
to deny the existence and importance of contentful and representationally based forms
of cognition; it is just that these should be regarded as emerging late in phylogeny and
ontogeny, being dependent on immersion in specific sorts of shared interactions (Hutto
and Myin 2013).
When it comes to basic forms of cognition, the infant is, to use Wordsworth’s
famous metaphor, “father to the man”. The issue at stake is crucial since as
Sommerville and Woodward pointed out, assessing infants’ understanding of others’
behaviour provides not only a “snapshot of the developing mind of the child, but also a
panorama of the very nature of cognition itself” (2010:84). Several studies (Onishi and
Baillargeon 2005; Scott et al. 2010; Surian et al. 2007) demonstrated false belief
understanding in toddlers via completely nonverbal measures such as the violation of
expectation looking paradigm 1 (VOE henceforth). This gave rise to the so-called
“Developmental Paradox” (DP henceforth): if false belief understanding already
emerges during the second year of life, then why do 3-year-old children consistently
fail the elicited-response task2 (ERT henceforth) (Wimmer and Perner 1983; Wellman
et al. 2001) even when paradigms are used that reduce response selection and inhibition
demands (Sodian et al. 2006)?
It seems then that radical enactivists have to meet the following challenge:
P1 Empirical evidence strongly suggests that basic cognition is smart (since 15-
month olds seem to understand false-beliefs).
1 The VOE protocol tests whether children look longer when agents act in a manner that is inconsistent with
their false beliefs and relies on the basic assumption that when an individual’s expectations are violated, she is
surprised and thus she looks longer at an unexpected event rather than at an expected event.
2 In this famous experiment, dolls are used to act out a scenario in which Sally hides a marble in a basket and
leaves the room.While she is gone, Anne enters and moves the marble to a box. Sally returns, and the children
are asked, “Where will Sally look for her marble?”
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P2 Smart cognition necessarily involves computations and representations (of false
beliefs).
P3 Hence, basic cognition necessarily involves computations and representations (of
false beliefs).
There have been roughly two main representationalist lines of response to the
Developmental Paradox. Some authors argued that preverbal human infants do
represent/understand false beliefs and explain the puzzle by arguing that ERTs require
not only the ability to ascribe false beliefs, but also language understanding, pragmatic
competence and more importantly, executive functioning control.3 Call this the rich
interpretation (Baillargeon et al. 2010; Hala et al. 2003; Leslie et al. 2005).
Another solution is to account for P1 without crediting infants with false-belief
understanding. The idea is to moderate P2 by claiming that preverbal infants’ under-
standing is either behavioural rule-based (Perner and Ruffman 2005) or supported by
an efficient but inflexible subsystem manipulating contentful informational states
(Apperly and Butterfill 2009). Indeed, some theorists claim that apparent success on
VOE trials in early infancy can be explained without supposing that infants have an
understanding of beliefs at all. Call this the weak interpretation.
Opposing these representationalist views, radical enactivists aim to account for
infants’ success on VOE trials without endorsing P2 at all. They argue that one could
simply let go of the idea that perceptions are representations and that basic cognition is
essentially contentful in the first place. Rather, “basic cognition is literally constituted
by, and to be understood in terms of, concrete patterns of environmental organismic
activity, nothing more or less” (Hutto and Myin 2013:11).
Recently, De Bruin and Kästner (2012) proposed a middle-ground solution between
representationalism and enactivism, namely Dynamic Embodied Cognition (DEC) and
argued that when it comes to social cognition, “current articulations of enactivism are—
despite their celebrated successes in explaining some cases of social interaction—not
yet up to the task”(2012:541).
The aim of this paper is to illustrate that endorsing a reconciliatory-based solution
does not provide us with a satisfactory solution to the Developmental Paradox. Rather, I
shall claim, the puzzle is better explained within a REC-based framework, i.e. in terms
of direct perception and situated interactions between agents and worldly offerings.
First, I argue that some cognitivist residuals prevent DEC from truly meeting the
challenge of the Developmental Paradox. Then I suggest an enactive response to the
DP and argue that two implicit ingredients of the ERT tests, namely i) the verbal
interaction and ii) the time–pressure factor, have been disregarded although they play a
crucial role in false-belief failures in 3-year old children. This paper proceeds as
follows. In section 2 I briefly sketch the reconciliatory Dynamic Embodied Cognition
(DEC) account. In section 3 I address the issue whether the DEC is more likely to
succeed in explaining the DP. Finally, section 4 illustrates how a REC-inspired strategy
3 Executive functioning refers to a set of cognitive faculties that underlie goal-directed behavior and cognitive
control across conceptual domains such as inhibitory control – i.e. the capacity to overcome one’s putatively
prepotent tendencies to simply say what is true and known – working memory, attention and error monitoring,
etc.
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meets the challenge of explaining the DP without crediting preverbal infants with
sophisticated metarepresentational decoupling.
2 The Dynamic Reconciliatory Strategy: Taking Enactive Approaches on Board
In recent years, the propensity to analyse cognition on the basis of purely abstract
models totally unrelated to the life of the body, of the social/physical environment, and
of the brain regions governing the body’s functioning in the world, has been vigorously
challenged. As a result, a number of theorists have agreed to take certain enactivist-
based insights on board, while still maintaining a cognitivist-based explanatory frame-
work. For example, De Bruin and Kästner (2012) recently proposed that the
Developmental Puzzle is best addressed in terms of the relation between coupled
(online) and decoupled (offline) processes for basic and advanced forms of (social)
cognition as opposed to merely representing/ not representing false beliefs. In what
follows, I examine whether their middle-ground strategy is more likely to explain the
puzzle. The upshot is to illustrate that although the DEC interpretation proposes some
very interesting and helpful insights, the Developmental Puzzle remains unsolved.
Before delving deeper into De Bruin & Kästner’s argument, some terminological
clarifications are needed. They define cognition4 as a kind of “information processing,
without necessarily involving symbolic representations per se” (2012:541). Building
upon this minimal definition, De Bruin and Kästner hold that the main characteristic of
offline processing is the manipulation of information that is currently unavailable (i.e.
not directly observable) in the environment (but typically has been present on previous
occasions and therefore has to be internally represented). In contrast, online processing
does not require recourse to such internal representations, but instead manipulation of
information that is currently and readily available (i.e. directly observable) in the
environment. Representations can be “any kind of stand-in for another item that will
typically be understood as grounded in enaction but subsequently taken offline” (De
Bruin and Kästner 2012:553, emphasis added). Note that taking processes offline can
provide a serious advantage because it allows the agent to withdraw from the imme-
diate surroundings so as not to automatically act upon particular affordances. The DEC
is set up to accommodate both (1) the role of interaction with one’s environment
(enactivist-based thesis) and (2) the role of offline processes in social cognition
(cognitivist-inspired thesis). Although the authors acknowledge a substantial cognitivist
heritage insofar as they conceive of cognition as information processing, they none-
theless insist on the importance of bodily actions and environmental features in at least
some cases of online cognitive processing. However, they go on arguing that if
enactive/embodied accounts are to bridge the cognitive gap, they must not only
acknowledge advanced offline social cognitive abilities but also explain these
“decoupled” modes of social cognition without falling back into the cognitivist camp.
4 One anonymous referee pointed out that De Bruin & Kästner could adopt another definition of cognition
while keeping the fundamentals of DEC intact. However, as we shall see shortly, it is crucial for their solution
to the puzzle to hold that preverbal infants are already capable of processing – via offline decoupling –
internally represented information. REC challenges this claim and argues that situating the decoupling
processing earlier in development does not help us to bridge the cognitive gap.
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That is, “the enactivist has to tell a story about how offline (i.e. decoupled) social
cognition is grounded in and emerges from online (i.e. coupled) interaction”
(2012:547).
According to De Bruin and Kästner, rephrasing the issue in terms of online/
offline processing provides us with an explanation of the Developmental
Puzzle. How exactly does this work? First, the authors take for granted the
premise that infants are equipped with “implicit” abilities that start out as
grounded in basic online processes, albeit partly decoupled. It is crucial for
their project that these basic implicit abilities already involve decoupling. This
is in line with the cognitivist distinction between (a) sub-doxastic mental states
that do not possess truth-evaluable propositional content and (b) robust mental
states (Spaulding 2010:123). In a second step, they hold that infants’ “implicit”
abilities develop gradually into more sophisticated explicit abilities that rely on
offline processes to a much larger extent. Here it is worth quoting De Bruin
and Kästner at length:
“Cognition is (developmentally) grounded in the agent’s coupling to her
surroundings. This coupling is dynamic insofar it allows agents to (a) rely
on direct online cognitive processes, or (b) decouple from their environ-
ment and engage in offline cognitive processing. Online processing is
‘cheap’ and efficient as it allows the agent to avoid building up ‘costly’
internal representations which would require additional processing re-
sources; however, it comes at the cost of limited and inflexible respon-
siveness. Offline processing provides agents with more flexibility
(autonomy) regarding their direct environment, but is also cognitively
more demanding. For a system to engage in decoupled offline processing,
it has to (a) inhibit automatic behavioral responses to environmental
features and (b) be able to elicit the behavior formerly coupled to the
presence of a certain stimulus independently of environmental stimula-
tion.” (2012:553).
The coupling and decoupling relations between agent and environment ad-
vocated by DEC are dynamic in the sense that “they are a matter of degree and
never an end in itself. (…) The dynamic interplay of decoupled and coupled
processes may be used for optimization of cognitive processing.” (De Bruin and
Kästner 2012: 552 emphasis added). There is definitely much more to be said
about DEC, but this gives us the basic flavor. With these elements in mind, let
us examine whether this helps us to solve the DP.
3 Cheap Decoupling is not Enough: the Puzzle is Still There
Clearly, DEC borrows from the weak-strategy theorists such as Apperly and Butterfill
(2009) the idea that early mechanisms are “cheap” and “efficient”, while the late-
emerging mechanisms are “costly” but “flexible”. But they also borrow from rich
theorists (Baillargeon et al. 2010) the idea that preverbal human infants are already
capable of decoupling, i.e. taking their own reality-congruent perspective offline, albeit
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in a very limited way. Their ambition is to provide us with the missing link between
these two mechanisms without falling into cognitivist and enactivist extremes. The
necessary glue is supplied by the Dynamical System Theory,5 which is best suited to
explain the architecture of the dynamic interplay between coupled and decoupled
processes.
There are several problems with this interpretation of the Developmental Paradox.
First, De Bruin and Kästner argue that VOE scenarios require infants to process
differences between the visual information available to them alone and the visual
information available to the other agent, and this can only be accomplished offline,
since the other’s visual information is not directly available to the infant and needs to be
internally represented by her. Hence they jump to the conclusion that VOE trials
involve a capacity for (i) decoupling from one’s own online processing of visual
information and (ii) processing offline a representation of the visual information
accessible to another agent. This claim, however, is rather controversial. The other’s
mental state, although not directly observable (from a third-person perspective) to
another, remains directly perceivable and available in a second-person perspective.
The next section will make all of this clear.
Secondly, De Bruin and Kästner argue that ERTs require infants to not only
represent but metarepresent. That is, infants must not only (a) process offline the other
agent’s propositional attitude towards the object (i.e., her false belief about its location),
but also “(b) come up with a verbal prediction of the agent’s behavior on the basis of
her belief” (2012: 558). They claim that the decoupling required in (a) has been
demonstrated to place increasing demands on executive functioning and they support
their claim by quoting several studies stressing the robust correlations between: i) ERT
performance and response inhibition (Perner and Lang 1999; Cole and Mitchell 2000;
Carlson and Moses 2001); and (ii) ERT performance and working memory (Carlson
et al. 2002; Hala et al. 2003; Perner et al. 2002). Again, this is disputable. Evidence
from cross-cultural studies (Chen et al. 1998; Ho 1994; Sabbagh et al. 2006) and
developmental cognitive neuroscience (Saxe and Powell 2006; Ridderinkhof et al.
2004) casts doubt on the putative relation between executive function and false belief
performance. Indeed, in East Asian cultures, parents and teachers insist on the social-
ization of self-control in their preschoolers (Chen et al. 1998; Tobin et al. 1989). Given
this particular socialization, two hypotheses have been tested: (1) cross-cultural differ-
ences in the neurotransmitter systems will affect frontal lobe development and execu-
tive functioning performance (Chang et al. 1996); and (2) children from East Asia may
have earlier developing executive functioning skills relative to their Western peers.
Now, if Chinese preschoolers indeed have advanced executive skills, then according to
the executive functioning response to the DP, they will perform better on the ERT than
their Western counterparts. Yet empirical results show that despite the striking advan-
tage that Chinese toddlers have in executive functioning skills – for example, on
average, 42-month old Chinese children scored on par with 48-month old North
American preschoolers (Sabbagh et al. 2006) – there was no significant difference in
5 Importantly, the Dynamical Systems Theory can also provide nonrepresentational explanations of internal
brain processes (see Freeman 1975; Chemero 2009). Note also that Occam’s razor may apply here: if a given
phenomenon can be explained without the need of adding an extra ingredient – i.e. representations – one
should adopt the most parsimonious option.
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their ERT. This supports the hypothesis that executive maturation alone does not
account for preschoolers’ false belief development.6
Another important concern regards the use of the term “metarepresentation”. As S.
Scott (2001) pointed out, there is danger of confusion – with serious consequences for
the debate about the nature of higher-level cognition – between two distinct notions of
“metarepresentation”, as defined by philosophers (Dennett 1998) and by psychologists
dealing with the question of autistic disorders (Leslie 1991; Baron-Cohen 1995).
According to Dennett (1998), representations are themselves objects in the world, and
therefore potential objects of (second-order or meta-) representations. Call this
metarepresentation1. For example, drawing a cat on a piece of paper is a type of non-
mental representation, which is represented in the mind of the person viewing it. The
mental representation is of the drawing, but since the drawing is itself a representation,
the viewer has a (mental) metarepresentation of whatever it is that the drawing repre-
sents, namely a cat.7 By contrast, Leslie uses the term “metarepresentation” to mean
“(e.g., in the case of understanding pretence-in-others) an internal representation of an
epistemic relation (PRETEND) between a person, a real situation and an imaginary
situation (represented opaquely)…”(Leslie 1991:73) Call this metarepresentation2. This
definition does not sound at all like the definition of metarepresentation1 as second-order
representation pursued above. There is nothing metarepresentational in the sense of
“higher order representation” in Leslie’s formulation of the semantics of psychological
predicates. Building on this distinction, S. Scott insightfully argues that a representation
can contain other representations without being a metarepresentation1.
Consider (P):
(P) The child BELIEVES that Sally BELIEVES that the marble is in the basket.
In what follows, I shall argue that although (P) is a straight-up second-order belief,
this does not necessarily involve second-order representation, or metarepresentation1 in
Dennett’s sense. Against De Bruin and Kästner (2012), I hold that there are no
additional second-order “metarepresentational” skills involved in ERT as compared
with VOE trials. Much of what I have to say in this section parallels arguments from
Scott (2001) with which I am in close agreement. Scott convincingly argued that
second-order beliefs do not necessarily require metarepresentations1. It is only neces-
sary to have the ability to represent first order beliefs in order to have second-order
beliefs (Scott 2001: 940).
Take the following example of a first order belief:
(1) Melissa BELIEVES that her dog is dead.
6 The same findings have been replicated with Korean children (Oh and Lewis 2008). Moreover, develop-
mental cognitive neuroscience studies suggest that the neural bases of mentalizing abilities are clearly
dissociable from those that deal with executive functioning skills (Sabbagh et al. 2009; Saxe and Wexler
2005; Sommer et al. 2007).
7 Note that this is a hybrid form of metarepresentation – the drawing being “external” and not a mental
representation. Of course, one interesting question is whether hybrid metarepresentation is the same sort of
thing as purely mental metarepresentation. However, this need not concern us here. The important point is that
metarepresentation1 is cognitively demanding and humans are unique in their capacity to form this type of
metarepresentations.
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The crucial point here is that to simply hold a belief, Melissa need not be aware of
her belief or to hold an explicit representation8 of it. In other words, she need not think
to herself: “I believe my dog is dead” or “It is I who believes that my dog is dead”. At
this level of interpretation, we can speak of animals having this kind of online implicit
beliefs, although we may find uncomfortable the idea of dogs having implicit beliefs.
Now, consider the following example of a second order belief:
(2) Anne BELIEVES that Melissa BELIEVES that her dog is dead.
As Scott rightly points out, in order to get (2) Anne needs the representation of
Melissa's dog, the predicate DEAD, and so on. What she does not need is a represen-
tation of Melissa’s representation of her dog, the predicate DEAD, and so on. That is,
she does not need a second-order representation of any of these things. She can get by
with her own first-order representations. Given that neither Melissa nor Anne has any
particular need of belief representation in order to be a believer, Anne’s representation
of Melissa’s belief need not be second order. In addition, it would seem that what Anne
also needs in order to get (2) is a “representation of Melissa’s BELIEF”. The question
is: is there any metarepresentation1 involved here? Indeed, one might object
9 that
Melissa’s belief state involves already implicit or sub-personal representational pro-
cessing. Now, the distinction between explicit versus implicit or sub-personal mental
representations is a complicated issue and need not concern us here. For present
purposes, it is sufficient to insist on the idea that Anne’s holding a representation of
Melissa’s first-order belief (regardless of the fact that the latter involves or not
subpersonal representational processing in Melissa’s mind) does not amount to a
second-order metarepresenting1 (in Anne’s mind). But let us suppose for the sake of
the argument that Anne holds a representation of Melissa’s first-order implicit belief (B)
which in turn involves a certain sub-personal representational processing (S) in
Melissa’s brain. Now, if (S) is an implicit, sub-personal representation (in Melissa’s
mind), then one consequence would be that in metarepresenting Melissa’s belief (B)
[which involves (S)], Anne is not explicitly aware of what she is metarepresenting.
Indeed, given that one member of the double representational layer, namely (S),
remains opaque to her, Anne is aware only of what she is explicitly representing,
namely (B). Note that this is not a problem per se. Let us label this half-opaque
metarepresenting, metarepresentation3. If this is so, then I fail to see why
metarepresenting3 in this sense is supposed to be cognitively more demanding (for
Anne) than mere representing. In contrast, recall that in Dennett’s drawing example, the
viewer is fully aware of the double representational layer: he forms a mental represen-
tation of a representation (drawing) of a cat and this makes his metarepresenting1 a
genuine second-order cognitive achievement. Hence, it is not clear that higher-order
metarepresenting1 is at work in the Sally/Anne scenario and this casts doubt on the idea
that the ERTs require that infants not only represent but metarepresent.
To sum up, according to De Bruin and Kästner, ERTs involve a stronger form of
decoupling (precisely because it involves metarepresentational skills and language
8 Explicit representations are available to one’s explicit awareness, whereas sub-personal or implicit repre-
sentations are processed without one’s explicit awareness.
9 I am grateful to the anonymous reviewer who pressed clarification on this paragraph.
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processing), hence explaining the Developmental Puzzle. Although I agree with De
Bruin and Kästner in saying that (a) ERTs require decoupling, and that (b) the verbal
interaction with the experimenter during ERT plays a crucial role in 3-year olds’ failure
to report false-belief understanding, there is still something missing in the picture.
Indeed, I fail to see how (a) and (b) alone can solve the Developmental Puzzle, since, as
the authors themselves have insisted, the decoupling is supposed to lead to an optimi-
zation of cognitive processing. Everybody agrees that strong decoupling is an important
evolutionary advantage. But the mystery of the Developmental Puzzle stems from the
opposite situation. In order to truly solve the DP, they need to answer the following
question: why does stronger decoupling impair (at least in some cases) rather than
improve the “mental gymnastics” of representational manipulation? In other words:
why do weaker forms of decoupling do a better job in a complex task such as false-
belief understanding?
As I hope has become clear throughout this section, although DEC leaves the
Developmental Paradox unsolved, there are important aspects in De Bruin and
Kästner’s account that could help us to unveil the mystery. For example, one might
argue that the “coupling /decoupling/ recoupling” loop serves cognition for better and
for worse. That is, in certain circumstances, this dynamic interplay can alter rather than
enhance the online processing. But in what circumstances exactly? And what are the
most disturbing elements in the ERT scenarios? In the final section of this paper, I
suggest an enactive response to these puzzles.
4 An Enactive Solution to the Puzzle
Let me begin with a short thought experiment. Imagine you are sitting in a soft, warm
and comfortable place enjoying a piece of music. You are fully immersed in your
auditory experience. After the music stops, suppose I debrief you by asking for a
detailed verbal report about your recent experience. If my line of reasoning is correct, I
predict that the more active and pressing our interactions are, the poorer your verbal-
report performance will be.10 This is because instead of leisurely building decoupled
representations of your recently experienced scenario, your priority now is to process
and regulate the online social interaction with me, the experimenter. Indeed, it is crucial
for our survival as human animals to successfully deal with moment-to-moment
processing first, before safely withdrawing and manipulating offline (decoupled)
information.
With this is mind, let us return to the Developmental Puzzle. Recall that visual
perception plays a crucial role in processing the implicit false-belief understanding as
opposed to the explicit/verbal-report condition. But why is perception, in some cases,
“smarter” than explicit and verbalized thinking? In order to deal with this question, it is
perhaps helpful to proceed in two steps. Part (A) suggests that preverbal infants’
success during VOE trials involves a pragmatic, action-oriented form of understanding
based on direct perceptual processing of others’ intentional attitudes rather than on
10 A recent study (Rubio-Fernández 2013) illustrated that perspective tracking is a continuous process that can
be easily disrupted in adults by a subtle visual manipulation in both indirect and direct false-belief tasks. I am
grateful to the anonymous referee who directed me to this reference.
Under Pressure: Processing Representational Decoupling in False-Belief Tasks 535
false-belief computing. Part (B) accounts for 3-year olds’ failure during ERT and argues
that the verbal-report interaction between the child and the experimenter elicits repre-
sentational (and not metarepresentational) decoupling and may fall apart under pres-
sure. In what follows, I shall address each part in turn.
(A) Unlike De Bruin and Kästner, I reject the idea that basic forms of mentality are
representational and that during VOE scenarios, infants must rely on internal represen-
tations of visual information that is available to the other agent but not available to
them. Rather, infants understand others’ intentional attitudes as currently and readily
available (i.e. directly observable) in the environment. To support this claim, I appeal to
empirical findings illustrating that (i) infants’ ability to understand other minds is rooted
in their capacity to actively engage in interactive scenarios; and (ii) knowledge of visual
perspective-taking is a relatively late cognitive achievement that is derivative from
social11 perspective-taking. Then I argue that these findings might raise a puzzle for De
Bruin & Kästner’s representationalist decoupling strategy. The overarching aim is to
illustrate that: (a) nonrepresentational embodied practices might be at work and explain
basic forms of intersubjective engagement; and (b) people’s perceptions depend criti-
cally on their interactions with the environment rather than on internal information
processing based on external visual observations (Brockmole et al. 2013).
Consistent with a burgeoning literature suggesting a common basis for both the
production and perception of action, evidence has been mounting to illustrate that
infants’ understanding of others is more robust within interactive contexts (Király
2009; Moll et al. 2008). In other words, the more engaged the interactions infants/
agents are the more robust the infants’ understanding of others becomes.12 Before their
first birthday, preverbal human infants not only understand what goals or preferences
others have (Gergely et al. 1995; Repacholi and Gopnik 1997); they also track what
others know, in the sense of what they have and have not experienced in the immediate
past. Indeed, several studies suggest that visual perspective-taking does not precede
ontogenetically but follows social perspective-taking (Moll and Kadipasaoglu 2013).
Children first learn to discern or establish reference in situations that are not defined by
differences in how self and other perceive agents and objects visually but by differences
in their shared experiential backgrounds, i.e. in what they did, witnessed or heard. For
example, Moll and Tomasello (2007) tested the child’s abilities to recall an adults’
knowledge of what she has experienced in three conditions: (1) the child and adult
together interacted with a toy; (2) the infant handled the toy with another experimenter,
while the adult watched (and the infant was alerted to this several times); (3) the adult
handled a toy alone, while the infant watched. As Wilby (2012) pointed out, one might
describe the difference in evidence that is available to the infant as follows:
(1) X is aware that [I am aware that [X is aware that [p]]].
11 Social perspective-taking is a set of manifold abilities of infants which helps them to establish reference
against the background of prior social interactions.
12 For example, Sommerville et al. (2005) demonstrated that 3-month olds focus on the relation between an
agent and her goal if they reached for (and not merely looked at) a toy before observing another actor grasping
it. Also 10-month olds who received active training in pulling a cane to retrieve a toy subsequently registered
another person’s cane-pulling action as goal-directed behavior, while infants who underwent mere observa-
tional training were unable to do this. Importantly, goal-relatedness is differently perceived by infants in social
versus physical event configurations (Woodward et al. 2001).
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(2) X is aware that [I am aware that [p]].
(3) X is aware that p.
Now, if we apply De Bruin and Kästner’s “degrees of decoupling” explan-
atory strategy in this specific case, then one could expect that infants would
find the first condition (1) the hardest, since it involves several embedded
“layers” of decoupling. Yet, the evidence suggests the complete opposite.
Hence, it is not clear that crediting infants with an implicit representational
decoupling ability is the best strategy here. Of course, this is not a knockdown
argument against the representationalist approach. But endorsing a radically
enactivist account avoids this problem and could potentially explain basic forms
of joint attending, those of the non-linguistically-mediated online sort, by
stressing the crucial role of embodied interactions (Gallagher and Varga
2013). Indeed, the subject’s understanding of a scenario corresponds to the
subject’s potential for skilful interaction with worldly objects and social agents
involved in that scenario. Furthermore, infants’ own actions inform their per-
ceptions of goal-directed behaviour (Falck-Ytter et al. 2006) and thereby con-
tribute to their ability to view others as goal-directed agents. Hence, this (re)-
enacted relationship with the world “suffused with practical understanding, is
what perceptual experience essentially is” (Ward 2012: 738, original emphasis).
(B) The second part of my argumentation concerns the explicit question (P) the child
faces during ERT trials:
(P) Where will Sally look for her marble?
Note that there are at least two implicit components that situate this embodied
interaction within a specific context and thereby play a crucial role during ERT, namely
the verbal-report interaction component (Q1) and the time–pressure component (Q2):
(Q1) You tell me (P).
(Q2) You tell me now (P).
Importantly, during VOE trials, infants are “left alone” to watch/process a
scene at their leisure: there is no offline-based task to cope with, and no
additional verbally interactive ingredients to disturb them from enjoying/
understanding the story happening live, so to speak. In contrast, dealing with
an explicit verbal-report demand places a supplementary pressure on the child’s
shoulders. Now, it is crucial for my argumentation here to distinguish between
verbal expressions of (P) and verbal interactions about (P). Indeed, someone
might object13 that already in a study by Clements and Perner (1994) when the
experimenter wondered aloud to himself, ‘I wonder where will Sally look for
her marble?’ children immediately looked at the right place as a rule. But
compare (Q1) with (Q3):
(Q1) You tell me (P).
(Q3) (I wonder (P)).
13 I am indebted to comments from an anonymous referee for pressing the clarification in this paragraph.
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In both cases, the experimenter verbally expresses (P).14 But whilst in (Q3) the child
is passively (leisurely) witnessing a self-addressed monologue, in (Q1) he is actively
invited to engage into an interactive dialogue. Hence, the disruption is not caused by
the mere verbal expression of (P), i.e. saying (P) aloud, but by the verbal interaction
about (P) between two relating agents. 15 And this is where the representational
decoupling steps into the picture, since in (Q1) the child has to take (P) offline.
Indeed, providing a verbal report to the experimenter’s question during the ERTs
becomes a genuine offline representation-based decoupling task: the child has to
regulate the intricate connection between her own takes on the world (coupling),
Sally and Anne’s remote doings (offline decoupling) and experimenter’s demand here
and now (online recoupling), and he has to do it fast, since the interrogator expects an
immediate response. There is simply no time to build up a full-blown mental model of
the scene, from which to derive a detached response, since during the ERT trials infants
are not allowed to step back and leisurely process the scene in order to give a
satisfactory answer. Indeed, it has been argued (Wilson 2002) that whilst online
sensorimotor-based coupling is designed to deal with real time/ run-time tasks, repre-
sentational decoupling as the one involved in verbal reports is time-costly and may fall
apart under time–pressure since it necessitates the fulfilment of specific conditions: for
this very reason, even adults do not employ it all the time, by default and in all
situations.16 Indeed, one needs to secure the task-relevant online scene first in order
to safely withdraw and leisurely engage in metarepresenting, hypothetical planning,
counterfactual reasoning, etc. However, if one lifts the demands of time pressure, some
of the true power of human cognition becomes evident. To return to our thought
experiment: if I leave you alone after your musical experience, with the command of
reporting your experience, you might actually be able to create a masterpiece. But you
will definitely need to process the scenario at your leisure.
To sum up: I argued here that when we mentally decouple from an event E, we are
already a step after experiencing E via our skilful interaction with worldly objects and
social agents. To put it in a slogan: decoupling processing supervenes on coupling
processing. This means that changes at the online coupling/recoupling level will trigger
changes at the decoupling processing level (if there is an offline take activated). Hence,
the primacy of the former over the latter might explain why 3-year olds give priority to
the online social interaction task and leave the decoupling representation-based task
behind.
Recall that the cognitive gap challenge is supposed to prompt enactivism defenders
to tell a story about how low-level sensorimotor practices transform into higher-order
representational skills. Indeed, one might object17 that the only way to avoid the gap is
14 Note that the verbal expression of (P) might be absent altogether, as in the “helping paradigm” trials
(Buttelman et al. 2009). This corroborates the idea that the disrupting ingredient in ERT is not the mere verbal
component, but the verbally interactive one.
15 A recent study (Rubio-Fernández and Geurts 2013) illustrates that nonverbal versions of the ERT allow
infants to keep track of a protagonist’s perspective over a course of events, whereas verbal designs tend to
disrupt the perspective tracking process.
16 For example, Keysar et al. (2003) have shown that adults’ first rapid guesses about the meaning of words
(using eye-tracking detecting measures) are based more on empirical generalizations (e.g. how a speaker has
used a word in the past) rather than on complicated inferences about speakers’ beliefs and intentions. This does
not imply that adults are unable to make such sophisticated inferences. However, these operations take time.
17 I am grateful to the anonymous referee who pressed clarification on this point.
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to endorse eliminativism and to deny the existence and importance of contentful and
representation-based forms of cognition. Leaving aside the fact that several theorists
have convincingly illustrated that the sensorimotor system actually has the right kind of
structure to characterize both sensorimotor and abstract concepts (Barsalou 1999;
Gallese and Lakoff 2005; Pecher et al. 2004; Hauk et al. 2004), it seems to me that
there are at least two additional strategies that REC proponents could endorse without
falling into eliminativism. The easy way consists in sending the ball into the opposite
court: if everybody agrees that the preverbal infant’s understanding is grounded in
perceptual activity, then cognitivists and reconciliatory defenders should come up with
a positive account of how exactly the implicit decoupling, supposed to be found already
at work in preverbal human infants, is “grounded in enaction”. That is, they have to
provide a story about how the alleged decoupled (albeit partly) representations are
implemented in the brain’s systems.
Another strategy, that I am inclined to endorse here, consists in dissolving the gap by
arguing that the problem might arise as a side effect of a coupling/decoupling/
recoupling investigatory interplay. Indeed, when we start to investigate cognition (both
theoretically and empirically), we inevitably address it through a high-level cognitive
lens which might distort our take on the original underlying processing which we find
already there, at work, with no gaps in it.
5 Conclusion
I have argued here that the reconciliatory DEC strategy (De Bruin and Kästner 2012)
leaves the Developmental Puzzle unsolved. More specifically, I have argued that their
commitment to the (rich) representationalist thesis according to which preverbal human
infants run offline/decoupled processing (albeit partial) prevents De Bruin and Kästner
from solving the paradox. While I agree with them in their claim that failures in the
coupling/decoupling /recoupling dynamic interplay are at work during ERT, I disagree
with them when they attribute these failures to stronger (metarepresentational)
decoupling demands. Rather, I suggested, infants fail because the ERT trials involve
representational decoupling tout court and what is more, under pressure.
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